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Abstract 
The past five years, Northern Africa and the Middle East have been characterized 
by revolutions and civil wars. Today, we can see two major civil wars raging in 
the region, one in Libya and another in Syria. In 2011, the UN Security Council 
(UNSC) passed resolutions that would ultimately lead to a military intervention in 
Libya, with the purpose to protect civilians from the regime. This intervention was 
legitimized by invoking R2P (Responsibility to Protect) and since then, R2P has 
been a reoccurring subject within the UNSC. R2P has both theoretical and 
practical implications within the scope of international relations, the latter being 
demonstrated by the intervention in Libya. In this paper, I have analyzed the R2P 
discourse within the UNSC and how it differs between the issue of the Libyan 
civil war and the civil war in Syria. By analyzing meeting records from the 
UNSC, I will show that the discourse itself has changed, but that the lack of 
intervention in Syria, within the R2P paradigm, is mostly a result of a ‘cold war’ 
discourse between the Western member states on one side, and China and Russia 
on the other. 
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1 Introduction 
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is arguably one of the strongest 
international actors when it comes to shaping international norms regarding peace, 
security, sovereignty and the ‘rules’ of intervention. It is here some of the most 
powerful countries in the world can pass resolutions to implement certain actions 
towards a state. But how do they reach their conclusions before passing these 
resolutions? How is the preceding discourse conducted? In this paper, I seek to 
analyze how the R2P (Responsibility to Protect) discourse has changed within the 
UNSC since the 2011 intervention in Libya, and how the discourse is conducted 
in relation to another specific problem; the Syrian civil war. Is there a clear 
turning point within the discourse, or is there a less concrete transition wherein the 
discourse has slowly changed over time? Are there now, as it was in 2011, any 
calls for R2P within the UNSC, or has the idea fallen out of favor among the 
member states? I will conduct my research by analyzing the content of certain 
UNSC documents, where I will try to identify arguments, as well as counter 
arguments, made within the R2P paradigm. My research question is as follows: 
 How does the R2P discourse within the UN Security Council differ between the  
case of the Libyan civil war and the civil war in Syria? 
In my first part, I will present the method I have chosen to conduct my research. 
In the second part, I will present my theoretical framework and relevance, with 
focus on the concept of R2P. Here, I will also present the empirical context in 
which the R2P discourse is taking place. 
In the third part, I will proceed with my analysis. Here, I will go through 
several UNSC documents that touches upon the issue of the Libyan civil, and the 
current issue of the Syrian civil war. In the fourth and last part, I will present my 
findings and conclude my analysis. 
  2 
2 Method 
2.1 The Political Discourse 
In this paper, I have chosen to conduct a discourse analysis, focusing on numerous 
documents that captures certain discourses within the UNSC. The method of 
discourse analysis is often attributed to Michel Foucault and a discourse “… refers 
to groups of statements that structure the way a thing is thought, and the way we 
act on the basis of that thinking”1. It is, in many ways, a linguistic tool and in a 
political discourse analysis we can analyze the language used by politicians (or 
other public figures) in a certain political context, which creates an organization 
within our social reality2. In this specific study, the actors are representatives 
within the UNSC. It should also be noted that passivity in its essence can have the 
same implications as action; both action and restraint requires an actor to make a 
conscious decision and both stances has consequences. 
Even though the method of discourse analysis was first seen as a tool to 
simply explain what is being said or written, the so called second generation of 
discourse analysis is more about the discourse as a social practice. This means that 
the discourse is not merely seen as a structure of language, but also a method 
where we look at the context, where social practice, institutions and situations are 
central3. In this specific case, the traditions and norms of the UNSC can be seen as 
the social practice within an institution, with the situation(s) being the two set of 
discourses I have chosen to analyze; that is, the civil wars in Libya and Syria. 
A discourse analysis is the best approach because of what it encompasses. Just 
reading and repeating what is written is nothing more but a review, if not put 
within its context. Without a context the words become empty, and with empty 
words, the problem we seek to explain becomes trivial. Instead, the discourse is 
being seen in light of certain events, which gives us a clear context, both social 
and – in this case – political. There is however a risk that a discourse analysis falls 
into a pit of overanalyzing the provided content. Just as a shallow review does not 
really give us any answers to how or why, dwelling too deep into a discourse 
could leave us in a situation where we make an analysis with the assumption that 
a source of the text or speech has the same linguistic and rhetorical skills as those 
who analyze, which in turn makes us analyze something that might not be there. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Rose, 2012, "Visual Methodologies, An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials", p190 
2 Berström och Boréus, 2008, “Textens mening och makt”, p 305 
3 Ibid. p. 307f 
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     Some would argue that a discourse is in itself political4, making it hard to 
define “political discourse” as its own method of analysis. However, I would 
prefer that the term politics, at least in this case, is used in an old institutionalist 
approach, focusing on the formal institutions, politicians, government, and the 
discourses that arises within these areas. That being said, a political discourse 
analysis could also be conducted with the focus on media, as well as social 
interactions. However, then we might need to revisit the definition of political. 
     Analyzing political discourse can, as with any discourse analysis, be seen as a 
way to identify different kinds of manipulation5. It does not matter if the 
manipulator is a proponent of something that is considered “good” or “bad”; the 
modus operandi remains the same. It is these manipulative or, to put it a bit less 
cynical, persuasive arguments being put forth within the UNSC that I seek to 
analyze. Who is saying what, for what purpose, and what are the results? 
Another central part of the discourse analysis is to focus on power6. In this 
case, power can be looked at in two ways. First of all, the UNSC is in itself am 
institution powerful enough to condone or condemn actions as a ‘global 
conscience’, implement sanctions and even legitimize military intervention. This 
is external power, which is used to exercise power over an outside actor (i.e. a 
state). Second, we can see internal power. This is the power certain actors (in this 
case, UNSC members) can exercise within a powerful institution. What actor uses 
its power for what purpose? This is, in short, exactly what my analysis will be 
about. How (and if) does one exercise its power within the UNSC and how does 
this exercise relate to the R2P paradigm? Is the power used to condone or do 
condemn the R2P concept and how does the discourse change over time? 
Discourse analyses focused on R2P have been conducted by many scholars 
since the concept was formally accepted in 2005. One such analysis was 
conducted by Aidan Hehir in 2011, in which he analyzed a 2009 R2P debate 
within the UN General Assembly7. Hehir conducted an in-depth analysis of what 
was said during this debate, in the same manner that I will now look at the past 
four years of debate within the UNSC. Hehir concluded that “R2P – in the form 
agreed in both 2005 and 2009 – lacks substance and is at most an emotive 
political rallying cry”8. Such a conclusion might be understandable, considering 
his focus on the General Assembly. However, since the real power lies within the 
UNSC, and especially with the permanent members, this analysis will show the 
immediate connection between discourse and (potentially paradigm shifting) 
decision making 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
4 Wilson in ”The Handbook of Discourse Analysis”, eds. Schiffrin, Tannen and Hamilton, 2001, p 398 
5 Ibid. p 399f 
6 Berström och Boréus, 2008, “Textens mening och makt”, p 328 
7 Aidan Hehir, 2011, “The responsibility to protect in international political discourse: encouraging statement of 
intent or illusory platitudes?”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 15:8, 1331-1348, p. 1332 
8 Ibid, p. 1342 
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In an article published 2013, Alex J Bellamy made an assessment of when 
R2P had been invoked by different actors, in relation to different conflicts around 
the world, including Libya and Syria. As part of his research, Bellamy analyzed a 
number of UNSC resolutions that had been brought forth as a result of the 
invoking of R2P. The core of his research was to see if the UNSC was more likely 
to act if R2P was invoked than when it was not, provided that the cases were 
similar9. Though my research bear some similarities to that of Bellamy’s, there are 
some core differences. Firstly, his focus lies on cases that took place between 
2006 and 2011, which excludes any in-depth findings with regards to the Libyan 
and Syrian crises. Second, he is only looking at R2P as a variable to decision 
making, and not at the specific arguments and counter-arguments preceding those 
decisions.  
2.2 Sampling 
 
The documents I have chosen concerns the subjects of 1) the UNSC stance 
towards the situation in Libya before and during the civil war and 2) the UNSC 
stance in regards to the Syrian civil war. Within these documents, I will be 
looking for arguments which in some way touches upon the subject of R2P and 
other forms of “just” arguments for – and against – intervention. 
I chose to focus on the UNSC since this is the arena where the ultimate 
decision making regarding intervention is taking place. One could, as Bellamy 
did, choose to focus on the General Assembly to get even more pluralism in the 
discourse, but since I want to put the R2P discourse within the context of 
intervention and non-intervention, the UNSC makes for a better instance to 
analyze. 
Since the start of the Libyan civil war in February 2011, the UN has published 
roughly 200 documents regarding the situation in Libya (before intervention, 
during intervention and post-intervention), as well as around 170 documents 
regarding the Syrian crisis10. These includes UNSC resolutions, UNSC 
presidential statements, Sanctions Committee documents and Human Rights 
Council documents. However, I have chosen to narrow down my sample to 
documents published under the label Security Council Meeting Records. The main 
reason for this is that these documents captures the discourses that have been 
taking place within the UNSC in a way that other documents does not. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
9 Bellamy, 2013, “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot Air?”, Cooperation and Conflict, 48:3, 333-
357, p. 337ff 
10 As of April 8th, 2015 
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The documents provide me with the answer to how certain actions (or lack 
thereof) are being legitimized within the UNSC, whereas documents such as 
resolutions mostly contains short and concise reports on what is going to be done 
as a result of the discourse. 
More importantly, resolutions are only adopted when there is a consensus (or 
at least absence of vetoes) between the five permanent members and at least four 
other (non-permanent) members11. It is a reasonable assumption that the pluralism 
within a discourse is clearer when there is not a consensus and since my ambition 
is to analyze the discourse, resolutions and other documents that are byproducts of 
aforementioned consensus can be excluded without undermining the validity of 
my research. The resolutions does not reflect how the discourse itself was 
conducted, just as a peace treaty does not reflect how a war was fought. That 
being said, I will still look at relevant resolutions as a mean to provide even more 
empirical context. 
The Security Council Meeting Records that I have taken part of consists of a 
total of 80 documents, dating from February 25th 2011, until Marsh 27th 2015. 
Fifty of these documents are, more or less, about the situation in Libya, and thirty 
of them are about the situation in Syria.  
I say “more or less”, since some of these documents are on the situation in the 
Middle East in general, and not specifically about Libya or Syria. However, most 
of these documents contain mainly, if not exclusively, discourses about my 
chosen cases. Having these documents will also help me to achieve the 
intertextuality that I need to get a good grip about the general discourse and its 
development12. It should also be noted that not all documents contain discourses 
that can be put within the R2P framework. Nonetheless, these documents do 
provide certain context. 
     When reading my sample documents, I have chosen to limit what themes that I 
will focus on in my analysis. R2P is inherently about the justification of 
intervention and therefore, arguments deviating from this discourse will be 
excluded. I will not simply look for certain words and make a list of how often 
these words are being used, and by whom. Looking at words such as protection or 
security does indeed tell me how common these types of discussions are, but it 
does not tell me anything about the context. Is security being discussed as 
something that should be improved in a certain area, perhaps through intervention, 
or is it discussed in the context of sovereignty and that the security problems 
within a certain country does not legitimize a breach of that nation’s sovereignty? 
Without the context, I cannot carry out a satisfying analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
11 UN Charter, Chapter V, Article 27 
12 Rose, 2012, "Visual Methodologies, An Introduction to Researching with Visual Materials", p191, 197ff 
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Instead, I will convey a more qualitative explanation of the general discourse. 
Simply showing if something is more or less common is not always preferable13. 
In my analysis, I will try to capture arguments and context, as well as the 
general opinion of different actors within the UNSC. Naturally, there will be 
much focus on the permanent members, and perhaps mostly on the United States, 
Russia and China. Since discussions about R2P and intervention were central to 
the UN during in the beginning of the Libyan civil war, I have chosen to focus on 
these themes and see how the discourse differs in relation to the Libyan and 
Syrian crises. 
Terms surrounding intervention, security and sovereignty are essential to the 
very structure of the UN, since the UN charter is based on a norm of non-
intervention and state sovereignty, while peace and security is what the UN seeks 
to achieve. Such terms is not only theoretically relevant, but also empirically; the 
concept of R2P was, after all, shaped within (and in some aspects, as a criticism 
towards) previous norms within international relations. 
In short, this can be said to be a mixed method approach. I have chosen a 
specific sample and made a framework not unlike the quantitative coding typical 
for a content analysis14, but the discourse analysis is still of essential importance 
for answering my question. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
13 Berström och Boréus, 2008, “Textens mening och makt”, p 77 
14 Ibid. p. 49 
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3 Theory 
3.1 Theoretical relevance 
Since the 2011 intervention in Libya, there have been numerous articles dealing 
with the subject of R2P. It is no coincidence that this debate flourished after the 
intervention in Libya, since it marked a new era within the R2P concept. Through 
resolution 1973, which was adopted March 17th 2011, the UNSC, with the support 
of ten member states, did not only urge the Libyan regime to protect its citizens 
but also affirmed that it: 
 
“Authorizes Member States that have notified the Secretary-General, acting nationally or 
through regional organizations or arrangements, and acting in cooperation with the Secretary-
General, to take all necessary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya…”15 
 
With this in mind, there is no doubt that R2P was not only one of the arguments 
behind the justification of intervention, but rather essential to it. There are those, 
like Dunne and Gelber, who would even argue that it was “a ‘textbook’ case of 
how R2P was supposed to work”16. In another article, Mohammed Nuruzzaman 
notes that the R2P discourse has ‘stalled’ since the intervention in Libya and goes 
so far as to say that “If R2P had come of age in Libya, it has certainly seen a 
tragic death with the Security Council’s inability to initiate actions on Syria”17. 
    The question has also been addressed by Marie-Eve Loiselle, who in an article 
seeks to look at the status of R2P since the passing of resolutions 1970 and 1973. 
As others before her, she argues that these resolutions led to the first real practice 
of R2P and as such marked an important point in the development of the 
concept18. This is no doubt a reasonable conclusion, since R2P was invoked by 
several UNSC members in the events leading up to these resolutions. 
     In the same journal, Patrick Quinton-Brown published an article on the subject, 
in which he tries to identify what he calls dissenter states; that is, states that 
oppose the concept of R2P, or at least the implementation of it. He does this by 
looking at discussions within different organizations within the UN, as well as 
voting records which can be tied to the concept of R2P.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
15 United Nations, 2011, S/RES/1973 
16 Dunne & Gelber, 2014. ”Arguing Matters: The Responsibility to Protect and the Case of Libya, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, (6): 326-349, p. 327 
17 Nuruzzaman, 2013,”The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Doctrine: Revived in Libya, Buried in Syria”, Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 15. No. 2, 57-66, p. 58 
18 Loiselle, 2013, “The Normative Status of the Responsibility to Protect after Libya”, Global Responsibility to 
Protect, (5), 317-341, p. 326ff 
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He categorizes these dissenters as cautious supporters and rejectionists. He also 
puts forth several categories of criticism (“thematic objections”) that are 
commonly argued by these states19. Even though I will conduct a similar analysis, 
I do not have the intention to make generic categories, though my findings to 
some extent might be placed within such boundaries. It should also be noted that 
Quinton-Brown is offering an analysis on the general R2P discourse, and not the 
discourse within a specific context, which I will be doing. Furthermore, his 
analysis stretches from 2005 until 2013, while this analysis will focus on a four 
year period (2011-2015). 
     It is with this theoretical context that I conduct my research, and for which I 
seek to contribute with a more in-depth analysis concerning the UNSC discourse 
within the R2P paradigm. I do not seek to have a normative entry point, and will 
therefore not discuss how the discourse should be conducted, nor will I try to 
make any guidelines about how the future of R2P should be shaped and 
implemented. 
     The concept of R2P has been widely criticized, both by states and (perhaps 
foremost) by scholars. Some of these critics argue that R2P makes it easy to 
legitimize intervention and that it can be used as an excuse for neo-imperialism. 
Others critics argue that R2P has made no positive contribution to international 
politics20. 
      It is with this in mind that I approach my analysis. Is it possible to see if R2P, 
or at least the perception of its implementations, has lost its value within the 
UNSC? Can we understand the actions (or inactions) in relation to the Libyan and 
Syrian civil wars by analyzing the R2P discourse or is there perhaps some other 
variables that explains the decisions in these matters? Can R2P, and its value 
within the UNSC, provide us with an explanation or will we be able to exclude 
R2P as a variable entirely? Whatever the answer to these questions may be, it is 
clear that the conclusion of this analysis will, at the very least, show us what has 
happened with the R2P discourse during the past four years. 
3.2 Empirical context 
The intervention in Libya marked a new chapter within the rules (written or 
unwritten) of international relations, where the norm of non-intervention was 
‘sidelined’ in an effort to legitimize an intervention. It also meant overriding one 
of the fundamental pillars in the international order; state sovereignty. 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
19 Quinton-Brown, 2013, “Mapping Dissent: The Responsibility to Protect and its State Critics”, Global 
Responsibility to Protect, (5): 260-282, p. 260ff 
20 Bellamy, 2013, “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot Air?”, Cooperation and Conflict, 48:3, 
333-357, p. 334 
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The ideas of state sovereignty are based on a Westphalian order, where the status 
quo between sovereign states is essential and, in our modern era, central for global 
stability. This is not only a notion based on theory, but has also been well 
established within international law21. It was first, and foremost, established with 
the UN Charter, in article 33, which states that: 
 
“1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance 
of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2. The Security Council shall, when it 
deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means”22. 
 
This norm of non-intervention was further established by the General 
Assembly, through resolution 2131, December 1965: 
 
“No State has the right to intervene […] in the internal or external affairs of any State. 
Consequently, armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against 
the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements, are 
condemned”.23 
 
There is one exception to this rule, which we find in the seventh chapter of the 
UN charter. This exception, however, is only permissible in cases where a state 
poses a severe threat to international peace24. In 2003, when there was an 
intensive discourse about an intervention in Iraq, the US invasion was, and has 
since been, highly criticized. However, the US justified their intervention by 
referring to (alleged) weapons of mass destruction in Iraqi possession, which in 
turn could be seen as a potential external threat.  
Even though this was not the general position on the international arena 
(including the UN), a threat – real or not – was needed to legitimize a preemptive 
intervention.  
This was not the case in Libya, nor is it the case in Syria. Neither the Libyan, 
nor the Syrian government, posed a threat to any other state and intervention is 
therefore hard to justify, if we consider the UN charter and resolution 2131.  
It is in this context we need to look at the concept of R2P. It was in the 
document “We the people – The role of the United Nations in the 21st Century”, 
that then secretary general Kofi Annan addressed the ‘dilemma of intervention’. 
Published in 2000, the document was written after a decade of bloody civil wars, 
ethnic cleansing and genocide. It was with this in mind that Annan posed the 
following question: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
21 Amstutz, 2008. International Ethics: concepts, theories and cases in global politics, p. 114ff 
22 UN Charter, article 33, via https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/ctc/uncharter.pdf 
23 United Nations, 1965, A/RES/20/2131 
24 Amstutz, 2008. International Ethics: concepts, theories and cases in global politics, p. 152f 
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“If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should 
we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
offend every precept of our common humanity?25” 
 
One year later, the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) released their document entitled “The Responsibility to 
Protect”, where they revisited Annan’s ‘compelling pleas’, and listed one of the 
core principles of R2P being that “state sovereignty implies responsibility, and the 
primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself”26. 
Even though the ICISS is not part of the UN, the ad hoc commission did put 
heavy responsibility on the UN to uphold the principles of R2P. 2001 marked a 
rapid rise of the concept of R2P, and went from a concept to an affirmed principle 
within the UNSC27. Five years later, in the 2005 World Summit, the responsibility 
to protect was explicitly, and perhaps ambiguously, affirmed. Though it states that 
any measures taken should be taken in accordance with the UN Charter, it also 
states that “… we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner…”28. 
      As mentioned above, the sovereignty of the nation state is of adamant 
importance within the rules of international relations. This, and the UN’s 
traditional norm of non-intervention, makes it hard to legitimize intervention – 
even if the cause can be seen as a noble one. What R2P then seeks to do is to 
redefine state sovereignty. By redefining (or at least intertwine sovereignty and 
protection, as the ICISS report on R2P did) sovereignty as protection29, a state 
failing to protect its own citizens can be construed as forfeiting its sovereignty. 
This creates a loophole within the norm of non-intervention and a state no longer 
have a carte blanche when it comes to internal affairs30, nor does it have to pose 
an external threat for intervention to be just. If mass atrocities (such as genocide 
or ethnic cleansing) are being committed within the country, R2P can be invoked 
to justify intervention. This is what happened prior to the NATO-led intervention 
in Libya. In this specific case, the reported killings of thousands of civilians 
quickly sparked a debate within the UNSC, and it was decided that the Libyan 
regime, led by Muammar Al-Qadhafi, had failed its citizens and thus it became 
the obligation of the international community to protect Libyan civilians. Since 
then, the R2P debate has been both extensive and harsh within the UNSC. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
25 Annan, 2000, We the people – The role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, p. 48 
26 ICISS, 2001, The Responsibility to Protect, XI. 
27 Bellamy, 2013, “The Responsibility to Protect: Added value or hot air?”, Cooperation and Conflict, 48(3), 
p333-357, p. 334 
28 United Nations, 2005, A/RES/60/1 
29 Thakur & Weiss, 2009. “R2P: From Idea to Norm – Action”, Global Responsibility to Protect. (1): 22-53, p. 
24 
30 Goldstein, 2011, Winning the War on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict World-wide,  p. 323 
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4 The R2P discourse within the UNSC 
4.1 The case of Libya 
4.1.1 R2P and call for intervention 
The discourse regarding the situation in Libya began on February 25th, 2011, 
during the 6490th meeting in the UNSC, where Secretary General Ban Ki-moon 
shared his concerns about a situation where “… issues of peace and security are at 
stake”. At this time, it had already been reported that over a thousand people had 
been killed, and that the Libyan regime had threatened with mass killings31. 
The Secretary General soon arrived to the R2P paradigm by arguing that 
“when a State manifestly fails to protect its population from serious international 
crimes, the international community has the responsibility to step in and take 
protective action in a collective, timely and decisive manner”. Concluding that the 
Libyan regime had failed to protect its citizens, he also affirmed that the challenge 
was now to provide “real protection” and to halt the ongoing violence32. 
Meanwhile, the Human Rights Council, in the same day, called upon the Libyan 
government to “meet its responsibility to protect its population”33. 
On February 26th, the debate produced the first resolution with regards to the 
violent situation in Libya. In resolution 1970, which was unanimously adopted by 
the UNSC34, the members once again turned to the concept of R2P, urging the 
Libyan regime to fulfil its responsibility to protect its population35. 
About three weeks later, on March 17th, the R2P discourse reached one of its 
most defining moments. During the 6498th meeting the United Kingdom (UK), 
then represented by Mark Lyall Grant, claimed that Libya was a “violent and 
discredited regime that has lost all legitimacy”36. It was also during this meeting 
that resolution 1973 was past37, which authorized member states to “take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians”. In practice, this resulted in a NATO led 
intervention in Libya. Even though there was a mandate to intervene in Libya was 
given, the resolution also established that there was to be no occupation or efforts 
to establish a new regime38. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
31 United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6490, p. 2 
32 Ibid. p. 3 
33 United Nations, 2011, A/HRC/S-15/2, p. 2 
34 United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6491, p. 2 
35 United Nations, 2011, S/RES/1970, p. 2 
36 United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6498, p. 4 
37 No one voted against the resolution, although Brazil, China, Germany, India and Russia abstained. 
38 United Nations, 2011, S/RES/1973, 1ff 
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Vitaly Churkin, representing Russia, abstained in the voting. Even though Churkin 
stated Russia is “consistent and firm advocates of the protection of the civilian 
population”, he stressed that the best solution would be a total ceasefire, and not outside 
intervention. He criticized the “passion of some Council members for methods 
involving force”, saying that it (the passing of the resolution) was “most unfortunate 
and regrettable”39. 
      Li Baodong, representing China and then acting president of the UNSC, shared this 
criticism and took an even more traditional stance, underlining the importance of state 
sovereignty and emphasized that China “is always against the use of force in 
international relations. He also referred to the UN Charter and the norms that governs 
international law40. 
       At the same meeting, United States (US) representative Susan Rice recalled the 
6490th meeting, stating that the Council had then (through resolution 1970) demanded 
the halt of violence in Libya and that this was done with respect to chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. She called resolution 1973 a response to the Libyan people’s cry for help, 
and that the US stands behind them in support of their (universal) rights41. 
4.1.2 Intervention and a halt in the R2P discourse 
An intervention by a coalition force, led by the United States, Britain and France, 
was initiated on March 19th, with Operation Odyssey Dawn. This was a direct 
result of resolution 1973, which was passed only two days before. The operation 
involved targeting of Libyan government forces and was later taken over by 
NATO coalition forces42. 
On April 4th, and again on May 3rd, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-
General to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Abdel-Elah Mohamed Al-Khatib, was 
invited to brief the UNSC about the crisis in Libya. Although pointing out that the 
responsibility for a solution was with the Libyan people, he also expressed 
worries about the continued violence in the country and emphasized the important 
of humanitarian support43. For the next few months, the discourse within the 
UNSC mostly consisted of briefings and updates on the situation, focusing more 
on humanitarian aid and the military clashes with the Libyan regime, than the 
legitimacy of intervention.  
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However, China once again pointed out the importance of territorial 
sovereignty and commented that they “are not in favour of any arbitrary 
interpretation of the Council’s resolutions or any actions going beyond those 
mandated by the Council”44. 
It was also during the second quarter of 2011 that the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for, amongst others, Muammar Al-Qadhafi. 
During the 6566th meeting, Lynn Pascoe, Under-Secretary-General for Political 
Affairs, recalled resolutions 1970 and 1973 and once again affirmed that the 
UNSC has an obligation to protect the Libyan people45. On July 28th, during the 
6595th meeting, South African ambassador Baso Sangqu, who voted in favor of 
resolution 1970 and 1973, expressed concerns about how these resolutions had 
been implemented. He noted that “taking sides in any internal conflict situation in 
an effort to institute regime change in Libya sets a dangerous precedent that will 
surely damage the credibility of the Council and its resolutions”46. This skepticism 
no doubt arose from the NATO support of opposition forces in Libya being 
carried out, despite the fact that the passed resolutions dictated that there be no 
efforts to change the Libyan regime. 
Through resolution 2009, which was adopted on the 6620th meeting on 
September 16th, the UNSC unanimously encouraged the National Transitional 
Council (which had earlier the same year proclaimed itself the “sole 
representative all over Libya”47) to protect the Libyan population, as well as 
human rights48. 
During this meeting, Russia, again represented by Vitaly Churkin, was yet 
again skeptical towards how the situation in Libya had been handled. He criticized 
the arbitrary violations of the no-fly zone, as well as ill-considered bombings that 
resulted in civilian casualties. He noted that the no-fly zone was created with the 
purpose of protection civilians, and that it now had become obsolete49. 
China once again took a pragmatic stand. Unlike countries such as the UK, 
United States, Germany and France, China did not make any statements regarding 
a transition to democracy, but instead focused on territorial sovereignty and 
security50. 
On September 26th, Mahmoud Jibril, chairman of the National Transitional 
Council executive office of Libya, appeared before the Security Council and 
thanked them for their support and the passing of resolution 1970 and 1973. He 
did, however, ask the UNSC to lift bans and the freezing of assets that was 
implemented through these resolutions. He stated that: 
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“…the circumstances that prevailed before the resolution was adopted no longer exist. It is 
therefore imperative to adopt a resolution that seeks to lift the freeze fully on those assets and 
funds so that the Libyan people can begin their reconstruction process”51. 
 
4.1.3 In hindsight: NATO withdrawal and continued fighting 
On October 27th, a draft resolution was put forth by several UNSC member states, 
including Russia and the US. In this draft, they expressed their strong support of 
Libyan sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. The signatories also 
welcomed the “positive developments in Libya which will improve the prospects 
for a democratic, peaceful and prosperous future…”52 It also included the 
termination of several paragraphs from resolution 1973 which, in practice, meant 
a complete withdrawal from Libya. The draft resolution passed unanimously as 
resolution 2016, on October 31st53. This meant that Mahmoud Jibril, through this 
resolution, had his wishes fulfilled. It was now up to the people, and especially the 
new government, to take responsibility and ensure the protection of its own 
citizens54. 
On November 2nd, the situation in Libya was once again on the agenda in the 
UNSC. It once again became a discourse about the support and encouragement of 
a democratic development in Libya. Several countries, including France, the UK, 
South Africa and Germany, recalled the early resolutions (1970 and 1973) and its 
importance regarding the responsibility to protect civilians55. Several countries 
also welcomed the (assumed) democratic and peaceful development in Libya. 
Russia, this time represented by Sergey Karev, expressed great concern 
regarding all fighting factions in the civil war. Even though several 
representatives within the USNC criticized the killing of Al-Qadhafi (who the 
USNC would rather see stand trail), Russia was more condemning. Others within 
the UNSC were still mostly focused on crimes committed by the Libyan regime, 
while Karev not only went to criticize rebel groups, but even the NATO coalition 
forces56. 
China, who had since the beginning of the conflict focused mainly on 
sovereignty and security issues, once again made a concise statement including 
their hopes about that Libya “… will safeguard national unity and integrity, take 
early steps to achieve social stability and begin political and economic 
reconstruction”57. 
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For the months to come, the discourse within the UNSC was mainly focused 
on the support of Libya and its reconstruction. On March 7th 2012, Russia, once 
again represented by Vitaly Churkin, turned the R2P framework against NATO 
and the Security Council, claiming that “civilian deaths were caused by actions 
that it had sanctioned, whereas they were intended to protect civilians”. He 
referred to International Commission of Inquiry of Libya, whose investigation 
“mentioned the deaths of dozens of civilians as a result of the airstrikes”. Churkin 
also criticized NATO’s silence in the matter, urging them to apologize and offer 
compensation for the civilian casualties. He further claimed that the Security 
Council and NATO should both take responsibility for such actions5859. 
US representative Susan Rice dismissed these accusations, claiming that:  
 
“NATO conducted operations in Libya to a standard exceeding what was required under 
international humanitarian law and in full accordance with the United Nations mandate to protect 
civilians and civilian-populated areas from attacks and the threat of attacks [..].The Commission 
found no violation of international law on the part of NATO60” 
 
France stood behind Rice in the question and Germany stated that NATO 
acted “in full accordance with the United Nations mandate to protect civilians”61. 
It was during this meeting that the criticism against the intervention in Libya 
became more explicit. Wang Min, representing China, expressed concern with the 
proliferations of weapons within Libya and said that “the Security Council should 
draw lessons from the way the Libyan issue was addressed”. He also seconded 
Churkin’s criticism regarding alleged civilian casualties caused by NATO 
airstrikes62. 
On March 2012, another meeting was held in the UNSC and the R2P 
discourse was again brought to the table, this time by French representative Alain 
Juppé. He highlighted the formal change in 2005 when, during the World Summit, 
the UN had agreed that it was the responsibility of the council to provide 
protections to those who had been failed by their own governments. He proudly 
recalled resolution 1973, saying that it saved thousands of lives and led to the 
protection of the Libyan population. He also stated that the questioning the 
legitimacy of the resolution, and its implementation, was an “utter distortion of 
history63. 
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During a later meeting, on May 16th, representative of the UK also defended 
the NATO operations, saying that “All NATO airstrikes were meticulously 
planned, including using precision guided munitions and intelligence surveillance 
and reconnaissance to strike legitimate military targets”64. 
On November 7th, Russia once again criticized the intervening policies of 
those involved in the Libyan issue. Sergey Karev shared views in line with those 
of some R2P critics, and stated that: 
 
“Attempts to impose alien models of State-development and State-building on Libyan society 
and to impose values that disregard local political and legal traditions and culture have resulted in 
a serious absence of stability and lack of viable Government institutions and of the rule of law in 
general.65” 
 
Martin Briens, representing France, had a different standpoint, arguing that 
Libya should serve as an example to show that inaction is inexcusable and further 
said that “hesitation and silence on our part do not help to save lives”66. 
During the second half of 2012, there were several reports of continued 
fighting within Libya. Despite elections and a new government, peace was not 
achieved. Both Tripoli and Benghazi, as well as other cities, were plagued by 
“bouts of fighting” and “serious security incidents”. Assassination attempts and 
car bombings directed at Libyan officials were also reported67. As of January 
2013, The Security Council had been briefed several times by the head of the 
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), which made it clear that the 
situation in Libya remained problematic68. These briefings were continuous and it 
had become clear that Libya a weak and insecure state, in large part due to the 
proliferation of weapons, and distrust towards the state’s security forces69. 
Resolution 2095, which was adopted unanimously, expressed deep concerns 
regarding these issues, but was yet optimistic regarding the future of Libya70. 
The defense of R2P made a brief return through Eugène-Richard Gasana, 
representative of Rwanda, on May 8th. He expressed Rwanda’s support of 
resolutions 1970 and 1973, expressing that: 
 
“Rwanda, as co-Chair of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect, would like to stress 
that the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians targeted by their own 
Governments and a duty to ensure that the perpetrators of mass atrocities are brought to justice”71. 
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This defense could hardly be seen as unexpected since Rwanda, about 20 years 
earlier, suffered a genocide which was largely ignored by the international 
community, including the UNSC. Rwanda had seen that inaction could have dire 
consequences. The representative of Azerbaijan also argued within the R2P 
paradigm, saying that protection of civilians and the fight against impunity for 
atrocities is the responsibility of the international community72. 
By May 2014, the growing instability in Libya had more and more come to 
dominate the agenda within the Security Council. The US was however still fairly 
optimistic about the development in Libya, and several member states still 
recalled the importance of resolution 1970. 
Russia expressed deep concern about the ‘rapid deterioration’ in Libya, and 
once again recalled reports about casualties caused by NATO airstrikes, saying 
that it “exceeded the parameters of permissible action under resolution 1973 and 
its objectives”73. 
In November 2014, during the 7306th meeting, criticism towards the early 
resolutions passed in 2011 had spread further. Philippe Bertoux, representing 
France, was concerned about the violence and instability in Libya, claiming that 
resolution 197074 had not really solved anything75. The UK also expressed 
concerns about the situation in Libya, but did not go so far as too share any doubts 
about the early resolutions76. 
During the first quarter of 2015, the proliferation of weapons and increased 
activity among groups such as ISIS has taken the discourse regarding the situation 
in Libya to be almost solely about counter-terrorism. 
4.2 The situation in Syria 
4.2.1 Initial reactions and open conflict within the UNSC 
On April 27th 2012, during the 6524th meeting in the UNSC, Lynn Pascoe, under- 
Secretary-General for Political Affairs, was invited to brief the council on the 
situation in Syria. It was in March the same year that demonstration within the 
country had started, as a result of the detention of several school children who had 
written anti-government graffiti. 
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     Demonstrations spread, and the demands for more freedom and political 
reforms increased and eventually, the protesters called for an end of the al-Assad 
regime77. 
As a result of these protests, the violence against the protesters increased and 
in the end of April, reports had come in that over 100 people had been killed all 
across the country. The reports also reported military operations in the city of 
Dar’a, where artillery was being used against civilians. These reports sparked a 
debate within the council, and US representative Susan Rice called “on the 
international community to respond to this brutal crackdown and to hold 
accountable those who are perpetrating these gross human rights violations”78.  
Mark Lyall Grant, representing the UK, responded with equal firmness, and 
affirmed that the Syrian government had a responsibility to protect peaceful 
protestors79. 
Even though Russian representative Alexander Pankin expressed concern 
about the situation in Syria, he took a stance that was in line with the non-
intervention norm within the UN. He pointed out that the situation in Syria did not 
pose any threat to international peace and security. He further stated that the real 
threat is rather outside intervention, “including attempts to promote ready-made 
solutions or to take sides”80. He warned that such actions only leads to escalating 
violence, also pointing out Syria as an important ‘cornerstone’ of Middle Eastern 
security architecture. China shared the Russian stance, hoping that any action 
from the international community taking place within the norms of the UN 
charter81. 
Bashar Ja’afari, who was invited to the UNSC to represent Syria in the matter, 
was not content with assigning blame to the Syrian regime, but rather condemned 
‘extremist groups’ for using violence as a tool to topple the Syrian government. 
While several members of the UNSC urged the Syrian government to take 
responsibility for its actions and protect Syrian citizens, Ja’afari responded that it 
was the primary responsibility of the Syrian government to protect its borders. He 
stated that Syrian authorities had stopped several arms shipments “that had been 
sent to groups attempting to undermine stability and security in the country”82. He 
went even further, saying that the situation in Syrian should not be an issue for the 
Security Council, claiming that such a discussion opened up for the insinuation 
that the Syrian regime does not protect its people. He strongly criticized the 
concept of R2P, saying that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
77 United Nations, 2012, S/PV.6524, p. 2 
78 Ibid. p. 4 
79 United Nations, 2011, S/PV.6524, p. 5 
80 Ibid. p. 7 
81 Ibid. p. 7f 
82 Ibid. p. 11f 
  19 
“… the age of colonialism has passed. All the peoples of the world are now aware of the new 
methods used by some States to interfere in the affairs of other States, be it in the framework of the 
so-called responsibility to protect or that of humanitarian intervention, which have been rejected 
by all developing countries, even as attempts are being made to ram them through international 
forums, including the United Nations. We have always feared that the use of such lofty concepts 
would undermine the unity, sovereignty and independence of the peoples of the developing 
countries”83. 
 
Almost six months later, on October 4th, several council members put forth a 
draft resolution. This draft expressed deep concern about the situation in Syria, 
and affirmed that it is the Syrian government’s responsibility to protect its own 
citizens, and that the government should allow “unhindered and sustained access 
for humanitarian aid and humanitarian organizations”. It also urged the Syrian 
government to cooperate with the UN. In addition to this, it called for the 
accountability of those responsible for all violence and human rights violations. 
The draft also left open for a possibility to act within article 41 of the UN 
charter84, which may include economic sanctions and implementation of no-fly 
zones (as was done in Syria through resolution 1973)85. 
However, the resolution did not pass, as both Russia and China made the 
choice to vote against the resolution, instead of abstaining as they did with 
resolution 1973. Vitaly Churkin referred to the principle of non-intervention, and 
reminded the council about the situation in Libya. He also expressed his criticism 
towards the concept of R2P, saying that: 
 
“The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately from the Libyan 
experience. The international community is alarmed by statements that compliance with Security 
Council resolutions on Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future actions of 
NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect. It is easy to see that today’s “Unified 
Protector” model could happen in Syria86”. 
 
China once again focused on the integrity and sovereignty of Syria but did not, 
at least not openly, share the more aggressive Russian tone towards the draft 
resolution and R2P. 
The US (who voted in favor of aforementioned draft resolution), represented 
by Susan Rice, expressed outrage towards the council’s failure to address the 
Syrian crisis and went so far as to say that several members “have sought for 
weeks to weaken and strip bare any texts that would have defended the lives of 
innocent civilians from Assad’s brutality”. 
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She explicitly pointed at Russia and China, because of their vote against the 
resolution. She also stated that the council should assume its responsibilities 
toward the Syrian people, and that it was now made clear who were supporting 
the “yearning for liberty and universal human rights” among the Syrian people, 
and who was not87. 
4.2.2 A small step from the status quo 
March 12th, 2012, the worrying situation in the Middle East (including Syria) was 
the main topic of discussion in the UNSC. French representative Alain Juppé told 
the council that it was their obligation to take responsibility, and that preventing 
them from assuming this responsibility is unacceptable. This view was shared by 
German representative Guido Westerwelle88. 
Unlike the meetings in 2011, this meeting resulted in finding some common 
ground with regards to the Syrian conflict. Russia, who had earlier been less 
willing to criticize the Syrian government, now condemned the violence and 
expressed that there was ‘no doubt’ that the government should be held 
responsible for its actions, and wished to provide unhindered access to provide 
humanitarian help to the Syrian people. Russia did, however, once again stress the 
importance of non-intervention. China expressed their willingness to take 
responsibility and supported humanitarian relief, but remained cautious in regards 
to any form of intervention89. During a meeting on April 14th, resolution 2042 was 
unanimously passed in the UNSC, which condemned crimes committed by the 
Syrian regime, and authorized the UN to deploy an unarmed observation team to 
assess the situation in Syria90. One week later, another resolution was, once again 
unanimously, passed. It called for the cease-fire of all fighting parts in Syria, and 
authorized an increase of UN presence91. 
However, the tone between certain member states remained harsh. US 
representative Susan Rice once again criticized members (implicitly referring to 
Russia and China) of the council for obstructing the UNSC responsibilities to take 
action, calling it ‘reprehensible”92. 
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Several representatives, including those from Turkey, Morocco, the UK, 
Colombia and the US, affirmed that it was the primary responsibility of the Syrian 
government to protect its citizens and that the failure in doing so calls for action. 
However, the members threaded lightly when talking about intervention, but 
instead focused on providing aid and protection for those who were fleeing the 
country93. 
On September 26th, another meeting took place, with the main focus on peace 
and security in the Middle East. As with the earlier meetings in 2012, it involved 
the condemnation of the escalating violence in Syria and the failure of the Syrian 
government to protect civilians, but any decisions could not be made with the 
support that was needed. The representative of France, Laurent Fabius, criticized 
the council’s inability to act, but also warned about the uncertainties surrounding 
the conflict. He noted that the continued reign of al-Assad is indeed a problem, 
but that his ousting could leave Syria in a fragile situation, which cold generate 
even more chaos94. 
In April 2013, humanitarian aid and the protection of those who had fled the 
country remained a common topic among the members. Leila Zerrougui, Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
highlighted the lack of responsibility taken by parties involved in the conflict, and 
expressed worries about the ever-shrinking possibilities for the UNSC to provide 
humanitarian assistance95. Just as two years earlier, Syrian representative Bashar 
Ja’afari took a firm stance against those who might be in favor of any sort of 
intervention, further explaining that: 
 
“The people of […] Syria oppose occupation and reject dominance and subjugation […] the 
people of Syria, who have thousands of years of history, will not allow anyone — however great 
or mighty, working openly or covertly, old or new, near or far — to threaten their sovereignty, 
dignity, political independence and national unity. Although there are some differences in the way 
Syrian citizens love their homeland, they are all determined to stand united in the face of any 
attempt to undermine Syria’s dignity, its political independence and its well-established national 
principles96“. 
 
He went on to criticize the ‘aggressive propaganda’ of some governments, 
claiming that they seek to justify an intervention in Syria under the umbrella of 
humanitarian intervention and R2P97. 
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In July, Ja’afari once again defended the Syrian government, claiming that 
they did everything they could to tackle their responsibility towards the Syrian 
people, in spite of “… arbitrary unilateral economic measures that have been 
imposed against the Syrian people by some States Members of this international 
Organization”98. 
Despite earlier disagreements and criticism from Syrian authorities, the UNSC 
managed to unanimously adopt resolution 2118, on September 27th, 2013. The 
resolution was passed in the light of recent events, including reports of the Syrian 
government deploying chemical weapons. In addition to condemn the use of 
chemical weapons, the council also determined that such use was not only a 
violation of several resolutions, but that it also constituted a threat to international 
peace and security99. 
During the same meeting where this resolution was passed, Rwandan 
representative Eugène-Richard Gasana once again brought up the paradigm of 
R2P, conveying a message from the Rwandan president, Paul Kagame, who 
wanted to inform the council that it was his conviction that the responsibility to 
protect is the primary mission of the UNSC100. Seeing similarities between the 
Rwandan genocide and the conflict in Syria, he expressed his concerns, saying 
that: 
 
“As in 1994, when the Security Council was prevented from intervening in Rwanda because 
of an unwarranted realpolitik prevailing in the Council, mostly among permanent members, the 
Council was once again unable to save more than 100,000 people in Syria because of ever-present 
divisions among veto-wielding members”101. 
 
Other than the notions made by Gasana, the concept of R2P was not presented 
within the discourse surrounding the resolution. Instead, the main focus were on 
the use of chemical weapons and the continued violence taking place within the 
Syrian borders. 
February 22nd 2014, yet another resolution was again unanimously adopted. 
Resolution 2139 stressed that the primary responsibility to protect its citizens lies 
with the Syrian government102. The purpose of the resolution was clear; drastic 
measures would be needed to improve the situation in Syria. However, there were 
no calls for intervention, even though some, like Argentinian representative, 
María Perceval, emphasized the importance of the responsibility to protect 
civilians103. Raimonda Murmokaitė, representative of Lithuania, also affirmed the 
Syrian authorities’ responsibility to protect the population104. 
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4.2.3 No end in sight 
On May 22nd, a draft resolution was put forth, signed by members both within and 
outside the UNSC, including France, the US, the UK and Libya. In the resolution, 
the signatories determined that the situation in Syria was a threat to international 
peace and security, thus opening up for actions in accordance to chapter VII of the 
UN charter105. 
French representative Gérard Araud appealed to the council, saying that the 
passing of the draft resolution would be a chance for them to restore their honor, 
and that it is not a political gesture, but rather a moral act. He further stated that a 
veto would “cover up all crimes” committed by the Syrian regime106. Samantha 
Power, who voted in favor of the resolution, stated that it was the council’s 
responsibility to stop atrocities and to ensure that those accountable be brought to 
justice. She criticized Russia, who voted against the draft resolution, saying that 
they are backing the Syrian regime, no matter what it does107. Mark Lyall Grant 
also criticized those who stopped the resolution from passing, saying that Russia 
and China should be ashamed and that their vetoes were disgraceful108.  
Vitaly Churkin responded by questioning France’s motives with the 
resolution, wondering why they would undermine the unity between the 
permanent members (P5), knowing that the resolution would not pass. He also 
referred to the actions taken during the Libyan conflict, saying that resolution 
1970 did not solve anything, but rather escalated the conflict. He also encouraged 
the Western member states to stop with their “futile, dead-end policy of endlessly 
escalating the Syrian crisis”109. 
Six months after resolution 2139 was passed, another meeting was held, 
focusing on the situation in Syria. The situation in Syria had worsened and several 
terrorist organizations, including ISIL and the al-Nusra Front, were now plaguing 
the civilian population through kidnappings, beheading and crucifixion110. 
Another month later, in September, the advancement of aforementioned terrorist 
organizations was on the top of the agenda. The increasing violence not only put 
civilians between the crossfire of several fighting factions, but also made it harder 
to provide humanitarian aid to those in need111. 
In February 2015, the responsibility to protect was once again raised, this time 
by Spanish representative Juan Manuel González de Linares Palo.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
105 United Nations, 2014, S/2014/348, p. 2 
106 United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7180, p. 3f 
107 Ibid. p. 4f 
108 Ibid. p. 7 
109 United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7180, p. 12f 
110 United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7252, p. 2f 
111 United Nations, 2014, S/PV.7273, p. 2f 
  24 
He shared his concern regarding the continued failing to respect the 
responsibility to protect, but also stressed that the solution should be political, and 
not military. Lithuania went further, saying that al-Assad was deliberately 
refusing protection112.  
On March 27th, in a meeting lasting roughly eight hours, the UNSC and non-
council states discussed the increased violence against ethnic and religious 
minorities taking place in the Middle East. The violence in Syria, especially 
crimes committed by terrorist organizations, was a recurrent topic. The issues 
regarding the failure to take responsibility for the protection of civilians were 
raised countless times, with several countries stressing the states central obligation 
to protect its citizens113. Others, such as the Netherlands, empathized that it is not 
only the state’s responsibility to protect, but also the responsibility of the 
international community114. 
As of May 2015, the situation in Syria is still looking grim, and the UNSC has 
not yet been able to take any action like those taken four years earlier in Libya. 
The discourse remain vibrant, but despite resolutions and condemnations, there is 
no intervention on the horizon, humanitarian or otherwise. 
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5 Conclusions 
The R2P discourse within the USNC has undoubtedly changed since the 2011 
intervention in Libya. That a state has a responsibility to protect its citizens is still 
a reoccurring theme among the majority of member states, and a principle that 
almost everyone agree to be reasonable. China is the most notable exception, as 
they focus more on sovereignty and security than the well-being of the citizens. 
The other four permanent members all agree that the main responsibility lies with 
the state, and three of them are still, perhaps mostly implicitly, calling for decisive 
action. Russia remains a strong proponent of non-intervention, but at the same 
time expresses great concern about the deterioration in Syria. The R2P discourse 
has not gone away but rather lost its edge, and even though there is no ‘rallying 
call’, several states (including the UK, the US and France) are frustrated about 
having their hands tied, due to the vetoes of China and Russia. The tone between 
member states has grown harsher and some non-permanent members, such as 
Rwanda, are hopelessly calling for the permanent members to act to prevent 
crimes against humanity and potential genocide. 
China and Russia have used the situation in Libya against those who joined 
the coalition forces during the intervention. Even though none of them voted 
against resolution 1973, they have used the deterioration in Libya as an argument 
against NATO and those in the USNC that actively supported the intervention. 
Going so far as to blame the intervention itself for the escalating chaos, China and 
Russia now has a go-to response when others call for an intervention in Syria. 
As the R2P argument has lost its edge, other arguments are being put forth that 
might make it easier to legitimize an intervention in Syria. The use of chemical 
weapons by the Syrian regime, and the general security issues surrounding the 
proliferation of weapons in the region, can according to some be seen as a threat 
to international peace and security. Since some argue that R2P is open for 
arbitrary interpretation that can create a slippery slope away from the norm of 
non-intervention, consolidating the idea that the situation in Syria poses an 
external threat could open up for intervention in accordance with the UN charter. 
Using intervention as a mean to protect civilians might not have fallen out of 
favor on a normative level and R2P is still considered preferable to inaction 
according to some, but when it comes to realpolitik, the criticism is ever-growing. 
The R2P discourse within the UNSC can be summarized as a fight between a new 
norm of responsibility and an old norm of non-intervention. As of now, the fight 
has reached a standstill and if a change were to occur, it is unlikely that it will 
strengthen the concept of R2P. As long as China and Russia stands firm on the 
subject, it is more likely that the inaction of the UNSC decreases the credibility of 
R2P as a viable concept. 
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